We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the singlewinner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We find that, for most of the rules in our new class, the complexity of winner determination is high (that is, the problem of computing the winners is NP-hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.
Introduction
The scoring rules in general, and Plurality specifically, are among the most often used and best studied single-winner voting rules. Recently, multiwinner analogues of scoring rules-called committee scoring rules-were introduced by Elkind et al. [EFSS14] , but our understanding of them is so far quite limited. In this paper, we seek to somewhat rectify this situation by asking a seemingly innocuous question: Among the committee scoring rules, which one is the analogue of Plurality? (The single-winner Plurality rule elects the candidate who is listed as the most preferred one by the largest number of voters.) Using an axiomatic approach, we find a rather surprising answer. Not only is there a whole class of committee scoring rules that can be viewed as corresponding to Plurality, but also one of the most 'obvious' candidates to be 'the multiwinner Plurality'-the single non-transferable vote rule (or SNTV, see the descriptions later)-falls short of satisfying our criterion. On the other hand, it turns out that the Bloc rule is quite satisfying as 'the multiwinner Plurality.' Yet, it certainly is not the only rule from our class and we believe that the other ones deserve attention as well.
We complement our axiomatic study with an algorithmic analysis of this new class of committee scoring rules. In particular, we show that it can be seen as a subfamily of the OWA-based rules 1 of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] (also studied by Aziz et al. [AGG + 15, ABC + 15]; see also the work of Kilgour [Kil10] for a more general overview of approval-based multiwinner rules and the work of Elkind and Ismaili [EI15] for a different OWA-based approach to multiwinner voting). However, the hardness results for general OWA-based rules do not translate directly to our case (and, indeed, some do not even hold).
Let us now describe our framework more precisely. In the multiwinner elections that we consider, each voter ranks the candidates from the most desired one to the least desired one, and a voting rule is used to pick a committee of a given size k that, in some sense, best reflects the voters' preferences. Naturally, the exact meaning of the phrase 'best reflects' depends strongly on the application at hand, as well as on the societal conventions and understanding of fairness. For example, if we are to choose a size-k parliament, then it is important to guarantee proportional representation of certain categories of the electorate (for example, political parties, ethnic or gender groups, etc.); if the goal is to pick a group of products to offer to customers, then it might be important to maintain diversity of the offer; if we are to shortlist a group of candidates for a job, then it is important to focus on the quality of the selected candidates regardless of how similar some of them might be (see, for example, the discussions provided by Lu and Boutilier [LB11, LB15] , Elkind et al. [EFSS14] , and Skowron et al. [SFL15] ).
In effect, there is quite a variety of multiwinner voting rules. For example, under SNTV, the winning committee consists of k candidates who are ranked first more frequently than all the others; under the Bloc rule, each voter gives one point to each candidate he or she ranks among his or her top k positions, and the committee consists of k candidates with the most points; under the ChamberlinCourant rule, the winning committee consists of k candidates such that each voter ranks his or her most preferred committee member as highly as possible (for the exact definition, we point the reader to Section 2, to the original paper of Chamberlin and Courant [CC83] , or to papers studying the properties and the computational complexity of this rule [PRZ08, LB11, EFSS14, EI15, SFS15, SF15]).
It turns out that the three rules mentioned above are examples of committee scoring rules, a class of rules which generalize single-winner scoring rules to the multiwinner setting, recently introduced by Elkind et al. [EFSS14] (see Section 2 for the definition). 2 Of course, there are natural multiwinner rules that cannot be expressed as committee scoring rules, such as the single transferable vote rule (STV), the Monroe rule [Mon95] , or all the multiwinner rules based on the Condorcet principle (see, for example, the works of Elkind et al. [ELS11] , Fishburn [Fis81] , and Gehrlein [Geh85] ). Nonetheless, we believe that committee scoring rules form a very diverse class of voting rules that deserves a further study.
In this paper, we analyze committee scoring rules in our search of a 'multiwinner analogue' of the (single-winner) Plurality rule. Intuitively, it might seem that SNTV, which picks k candidates with best Plurality scores, is such a rule, thus rendering this question trivial. However, instead of following this intuition we take an axiomatic approach. We note that Plurality is the only singlewinner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority 3 criterion, which stipulates that a candidate ranked first by more than half of all voters must be a unique winner of the election. We ask for a committee scoring rule that satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, a multiwinner analogue of the simple majority criterion introduced by Debord [Deb93] . It requires that if there is a simple majority of the voters, each of whom ranks the same k candidates in their top k positions (perhaps in a different order), then these k candidates should form a unique winning committee.
With a moment of thought, one can verify that the Bloc rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion. It turns out, however, that Bloc is by far not the only committee scoring rule having this property, and that there is a whole class of them. We provide an (almost) full characterization of this class 4 and analyze the computational complexity of winner determination for the rules in this class. Initially, we identify a somewhat larger class (in terms of strict containment) of top-k-counting rules for which the score that a committee receives from a given voter is a function of the number of committee members that this voter ranks in the top k positions (recall that k is the committee size); we refer to this function as the counting function. We obtain the following main results:
1. We prove that all committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion are top-kcounting rules. We establish conditions on the counting function that are necessary and sufficient for the corresponding top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. These conditions are a fairly mild relaxation of convexity. In particular, if the counting function is convex, then the corresponding top-k-counting rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion.
2. For a large class of counting functions, top-k-counting rules are NP-hard to compute (for example, we show an example of a rule that closely resembles the Bloc rule and is hard even to approximate). There are, however, some polynomial-time computable ones (for example, the Bloc and Perfectionist rules; where the latter one is introduced in this paper).
3. If the counting function is concave, then the rule it defines fails the fixed-majority criterion, but the rule seems to be easier computationally than in the convex case. For this case, we show a polynomial-time (1 − 1 e )-approximation algorithm as well as show fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the number of voters for the problem of finding the winning committee.
All in all, we find that there is no single multiwinner analogue of Plurality, even if we restrict ourselves to polynomial-time computable committee scoring rules. Indeed, on the intuitive level SNTV is such a rule, and through our axiomatic consideration we show that Bloc and Perfectionist are also good candidates.
Before we move on to the technical content of the paper, let us take a step back and answer one principal question: why did we look for the multiwinner analogue of Plurality? We believe that this quest deserves attention for the following two main reasons.
1. Until recently, multiwinner voting received only passing attention in the computational social choice literature, and it is still receiving only moderate attention in the social choice literature. In effect, our understanding of multiwinner voting is currently limited. Since Plurality is among the most basic, best-known rules, asking for its generalization to the multiwinner setting is a natural, fundamental issue.
2. There is a growing number of applications of multiwinner rules, many of which are much closer to the worlds of artificial intelligence, multiagent systems, and business, than to the world of politics. For the above two reasons, we believe that it is important to understand fundamental properties of various (families of) multiwinner rules. In this paper we explore and study one such fundamental property and the corresponding family of rules.
Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is a set of candidates and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a collection of voters. Throughout the paper, we reserve the symbol m to denote the number of candidates. Each voter v i is associated with a preference order ≻ i in which v i ranks the candidates from his or her most desirable one to his or her least desirable one. If X and Y are two (disjoint) subsets of C, then by X ≻ i Y we mean that for each x ∈ X and each y ∈ Y it holds that x ≻ i y. For a positive integer t, we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t].
Single-Winner Voting Rules. A single-winner voting rule R is a function that, given an election E = (C, V ), outputs a subset R(E) of candidates that are called (tied) winners of this election.
There is quite a variety of single-winner voting rules, but in this paper it suffices to consider scoring rules only. Given a voter v and a candidate c, The following scoring functions and scoring rules are particularly interesting. The t-approval scoring function α t is defined as α t (i) := 1 for i ≤ t and α t (i) := 0 otherwise. (If t is fixed, then the definition of α t does not depend on m. In such cases α t can both be viewed as a scoring function and as a family of scoring functions.) For example, Plurality is R α 1 , the t-Approval rule is R αt , and the Veto rule is R (α m−1 ) m∈N . The Borda scoring function (for m candidates), β m , is defined as β m (i) := m − i, and R β is the Borda rule, where β = (β m ) m∈N .
Multiwinner Voting Rules. A multiwinner voting rule R is a function that, given an election E = (C, V ) and a number k representing the size of the desired committee, outputs a family R(E, k) of size-k subsets of C. The sets in this family are the committees that tie as winners. As in the case of single-winner voting rules, one may need a tie-breaking rule to get a unique winning committee, but we ignore this aspect in the current paper.
We focus on the committee scoring rules, introduced by Elkind et al. [EFSS14] . Consider an election E = (C, V ) and some committee S of a given size k. Let v be some voter in V . By pos v (S) we mean the sequence (i 1 , . . . , i k ) that results from sorting the set {pos v (c) : c ∈ S} in increasing order. For example, if C = {a, b, c, d, e}, the preference order of v is a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e, and S = {a, c, d}, then pos v (S) = (1, 3, 4). If I = (i 1 , . . . , i k ) and J = (j 1 , . . . , j k ) are two increasing sequences of integers, then we say that I (weakly) dominates Intuitively, the function f m,k from Definition 1 assigns to each sequence I of k positions the number of points that a committee C gets from a voter v when the members of C stand on positions from I in the preference order of v.
A committee scoring rule is defined by a family of committee scoring functions f = (f m,k ) k≤m , one function for each possible choice of m and k. Analogously to the case of single-winner scoring rules, we will denote such a multiwinner rule by R f . Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m candidates, let k, k ≤ m, be the size of the desired committee. Under the committee scoring rule R f , every committee S ⊆ C with |S| = k receives score(S) := v∈V f m,k (pos v (S)) points (for this notation, the election E = (C, V ) will always be clear from the context). The committee with the highest score wins. (If there are several such committees, then they all tie as winners.)
Many well-known multiwinner voting rules are, in fact, families of committee scoring rules. Consider the following examples:
1. SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda rules pick k candidates with the highest Plurality, k-Approval, and Borda scores, respectively. Thus, they are defined through the following scoring functions:
is defined as a sum of functions that do not depend on either m or k, f Bloc m,k is defined as a sum of functions that depend on k but not m, and f k-Borda m,k is defined as a sum of functions that depend on m but not k.
2. The two versions of the Chamberlin-Courant rule that we consider are defined through the committee scoring functions: Intuitively, under the Chamberlin-Courant rules, each voter is represented by the committee member that this voter ranks highest; the Chamberlin-Courant rule chooses a committee C that maximizes the sum of the scores that the voters give to their representatives in C (which characterizes the total satisfaction of the society with the assignment of representatives to voters).
In the next example we show the differences between the above rules. Since these rules are designed to satisfy different desiderata, it turns out that on the same election they may provide significantly different outcomes. 
Intuitively, under a weakly separable rule, we can compute the scores of all candidates separately and the rule picks up the k candidates with the highest scores. R f is called separable if for fixed m the function γ m,k does not depend on k. We see that SNTV and k-Borda are separable, that Bloc is only weakly separable, and that neither of our two versions of the Chamberlin-Courant rule is weakly separable. Elkind et al. [EFSS14] show that separable rules have somewhat different properties than weakly separable ones.
Our two variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule are what Elkind et al. [EFSS14] call representation focused rules. A committee scoring rule R f , defined through a family f = (f m,k ) k≤m of committee scoring functions, is representation focused if there exists a family of single-winner scoring functions γ = (γ m,k ) k≤m such that:
Both Chamberlin-Courant and α k -CC are representation-focused, but, somewhat surprisingly, so is SNTV.
The 
The committee scoring rule R f corresponding to the family f is called OWA-based.
Intuitively, the OWA operators specify to what extent the voters care about each member of the committee, depending how this member is ranked among the other ones. Indeed, every weakly separable rule is OWA-based with OWA operators of the form (1, . . . , 1), which means that under weakly separable rules the voters care about all the committee members equally. Representation-focused rules are OWA-based through OWA operators of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), which intuitively means that the voters care about their top-ranked committee members only. Another interesting group of OWA-based committee scoring rules is defined through OWA operators of the form (1, 1 2 , . . . , 1 k ) and the t-Approval scoring functions (for some choice of t). We refer to these rules as α t -PAV (in essence, these are variants of the Proportional Approval Voting rule, cast into the framework of committee scoring rules by assuming that every voter approves exactly his or her top t candidates). Intuitively, such OWA operators indicate the decreasing attention the voters pay to their lower ranked committee members. For more discussion of the OWA-based rules, we refer the reader to the works of Skowron et al. [SFL15] and Aziz et al. [ABC + 15, AGG + 15] (the latter ones include a more detailed discussion of PAV; see also the work of Kilgour [Kil10] for a description of this rule). top-k-counting rules-that contains all the rules which satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. Finally, we provide a complete characterization of fixed-majority voting rules within the class of top-kcounting voting rules.
Remark 1. We note that in most cases

Initial Remarks
One of the features that distinguishes Plurality among all other scoring rules is the fact that it satisfies the simple majority criterion.
Definition 3.
A single-winner voting rule R satisfies the simple majority criterion if, for every election E = (C, V ) where more than half of the voters rank some candidate c first, it holds that R(E) = {c}.
Importantly, the simple majority criterion characterizes Plurality within the class of singlewinner scoring rules. The result is a part of folklore (we provide the proof for the sake of completeness). Since R γ satisfies the simple majority criterion, it must be the case that c 1 is the unique R γ -winner for each E n . Further, for a given value of n, the difference between the scores of c 1 and c 2 in E n is:
Thus, if it held that γ m (2) > γ m (m), then-for large enough value of n-candidate c 1 would not be a winner of E n . This implies that
There are at least two ways of generalizing the simple majority criterion to the multiwinner setting. We choose perhaps the simplest one, the fixed-majority criterion introduced by Debord [Deb93] (other notions of majority studied by Debord are variants of the Condorcet principle and are incompatible with Plurality and scoring rules in general). 
For k = 2, all three committees, {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}, have majority support in the sense just described. We feel that this is against the spirit of the simple majority criterion. Thus, and since we have not found any other convincing ways of generalizing the simple majority criterion to the multiwinner setting, we focus on Debord's fixed-majority notion.
One can verify that the Bloc rule satisfies the fixed-majority criterion and that SNTV does not (it will also follow formally from our further discussion). This means that in the axiomatic sense, Bloc is closer to Plurality than SNTV. This is quite interesting since one's first idea of generalizing Plurality would likely be to think of SNTV. Yet, Bloc is certainly not the only committee scoring rule that satisfies our criterion. Let us consider the following rule. Example 2. Let us, once again, consider the election from Example 1. In this election, for the committee size k = 2, Perfectionist assigns two points to committee {a, f }, one point to each of {b, c}, {b, d}, {c, e}, {d, e}, {e, g}, and {f, h}, and zero points to all the other committees. Thus, {a, f } is the unique winning committee.
We note that Perfectionist satisfies the fixed-majority criterion and that it closely resembles Plurality. The following remark strongly highlights this similarity. Naturally, not all committee scoring rules satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. For example, neither k-Borda nor the Chamberlin-Courant rule do. To see this, it suffices to note that for k = 1 they both become the single-winner Borda rule, which fails the simple majority criterion.
In what follows, we will be interested in knowing which committee scoring rules do satisfy the fixed majority criterion and which do not.
Top-k-Counting Rules
To characterize the committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion, we introduce a class of scoring functions that depend only on the number of committee members ranked in the top k positions.
Definition 6. We say that a committee scoring function
. We refer to g m,k as the counting function for f m,k . We say that a committee scoring rule R f is top-k-counting if it can be defined through a family of top-k-counting scoring functions f = (f m,k ) k≤m .
Both Bloc and Perfectionist are top-k-counting rules. The former uses the linear counting function g m,k (x) = x, while the latter uses the counting function g m,k which is a step-function: g m,k (x) = 0 for x < k and g m,k (k) = 1. Another example of a top-k-counting rule is the α k -CC rule, which uses the counting function g m,k such that g m,k (0) = 0 and g m,k (x) = 1 for all x ∈ [k].
Top-k-counting rules have a number of interesting features. First, their counting functions have to be nondecreasing. Second, every top-k-counting rule is OWA-based. Third, every committee scoring rule that satisfies the fixed-majority criterion is top-k-counting. We express these facts in the following two propositions and in Theorem 4. For the rest of the paper we make the assumption that m ≥ 2k; this assumption is mostly technical as our arguments are greatly simplified by the fact that we can form two disjoint committees of size k. Further, it is also quite natural: one could say that if we were to choose a committee consisting of more than half of the candidates, then perhaps we should rather be voting for who should not be in the elected committee. Proof. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Consider the sequences I t = (1, . . . , t, k + 1, . . . , k + (k − t)) and
Without the assumption that m ≥ 2k, Proposition 2 would have to be phrased more cautiously, and would speak only of the existence of nondecreasing counting function. (For example, for m = k, the function g m,k could be arbitrary.)
Proposition 3. Every top-k-counting rule is OWA-based.
Proof. Let us consider a top-k-counting rule R f , where f = (f m,k ) k≤m is the corresponding family of top-k-counting functions defined by a family of counting functions (g m,k ) k≤m . Let us consider one function f m,k from this family. We know that f m,k : [m] k → N is a top-k-counting scoring function defined through a counting function g m,k so that f m,
from which we see that R f is OWA-based through the family of OWA operators:
and the family of k-Approval scoring functions (γ m,k = α k ).
In the next theorem (and in many further theorems) we speak of a committee scoring rule R f defined through a family of committee scoring functions f = (f m,k ) 2k≤m . We use this notation as a shorthand for the assumption that the theorem is restricted to the cases where 2k ≤ m. Proof. Let us fix two numbers m and k such that 2k ≤ m. Consider an election with m candidates, where a committee of size k is to be elected. For each positive integer t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ k we define the following two sequences from [m] k :
1. I t = (1, . . . , t, k +1, . . . , k +k −t) is a sequence of positions of the candidates where the first t candidates are ranked in the top t positions and the remaining k − t candidates are ranked just below the kth position.
is a sequence of positions where the first t candidates are ranked just above (and including) the kth position, whereas the remaining k − t candidates are ranked at the bottom.
Among these, I k = (1, . . . , k) is the highest-scoring sequence of positions and
is the lowest-scoring sequence. Further, for every t we have I t J t and, in effect,
We claim that if there exists some t ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that f m,k (I t ) > f m,k (J t ) then R f does not have the fixed-majority property. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is some t such that f m,k (I t ) > f m,k (J t ). Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m candidates and 2n + 1 voters. The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ D, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x t }, Y = {y t+1 , . . . , y k }, Z = {z t+1 , . . . , z k }, and D is a set of sufficiently many dummy candidates so that |C| = m. We focus on two committees, M = X ∪ Y and N = X ∪ Z. The first n + 1 voters have preference order X ≻ Y ≻ Z ≻ D, and the next n voters have preference order Z ≻ X ≻ D ≻ Y . Note that the fixed-majority criterion requires that M be the unique winning committee.
Committee M receives the total score of (n + 1)f m,k (I k ) + nf m,k (J t ), whereas committee N receives the total score of (n + 1)f m,k (I t ) + nf m,k (I k ). The difference between these values is:
which, for a large enough value of n, is negative (since, by assumption, we know that f m,k (J t ) < f m,k (I t ) and so f m,k (J t ) − f m,k (I t ) is negative). That is, for large enough n, committee M does not win the election and R f fails the fixed-majority criterion.
So, if R f satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, then for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k} we have that
Unfortunately, the converse of Theorem 4 does not hold: α k -CC, for example, is a top-kcounting rule that fails the fixed-majority criterion. 
Criterion for Fixed-Majority Consistency
In this section, we provide a formal characterization of those top-k-counting rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. Together with Theorem 4, this gives a full characterization of committee scoring rules with this property. (ii) for each pair of nonnegative integers k 1 , k 2 with k 1 + k 2 ≤ k, it holds that:
Figure 1: Illustration of the condition from Theorem 5.
Condition (ii) in Theorem 5 is a relaxation of the convexity property for function g m,k and is illustrated in Figure 1 . We discuss this in more detail after the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let f m,k be one of the committee scoring functions and g m,k be its corresponding counting function. By Proposition 2, g m,k is nondecreasing so the fact that it is nonconstant is equivalent to g m,k (k) > g m,k (0). Moreover, we note that conditions (i) and (ii) imply that for each
. To see this we take k 2 = 1 and note that for each k 1 it holds that g m,
Let us now show that if for each m and k, g m,k satisfies (ii) then R f has the fixed-majority property. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with n voters and m candidates, for which there is a size-k committee M such that a majority of the voters rank all members of M in the top k positions, but M loses to some committee S = M (also of size k). That is, we have score(S) ≥ score(M ). Let ξ be a rational number, 1 2 < ξ ≤ 1, such that exactly ξn voters rank all the members of M in the top k positions; we will refer to these voters as M -voters and to the others as non-M -voters.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the non-M -voters have identical preference orders. Indeed, if it were the case that f m,k (pos
) for some two non-M -voters v i and v j , then we could replace the preference order of v j with that of v i and increase the advantage of S over M . If for all non-M -voters this difference were the same, then we could simply pick the preference order of one of them and assign it to all the other ones.
Let k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and k 4 be four numbers such that: Without loss of generality, we can assume that k 4 = 0 and that |S \ M | = k 2 (since m ≥ 2k, we can replace all members of M \ S with candidates from C \ M , and, similarly, we can ensure that all members of S \ M are ranked among top k positions by non-M -voters; these changes never decrease the score of S relative to that of M ). In effect, we have that
We can assume that k 2 > 0 as otherwise we would have S = M . Given this notation, the difference between the scores of M and S is:
where the second equality holds due to rearranging of terms, and the final inequality is an immediate consequence of the assumptions regarding the value of ξ and the properties of g m,k (namely, that
This, however, contradicts the assumption that score(S) ≥ score(M ) and, so, R f satisfies the fixed-majority criterion. We now consider the other direction. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that R f satisfies the fixed-majority criterion but that there exist m and k such that either condition (i) or condition (ii) is not satisfied. If g m,k is a constant function then R f fails the fixed-majority criterion because it always outputs all the subsets of size k, independently of voters' preferences. Thus we assume that g m,k is not constant. Suppose (ii) does not hold and there exist k 1 and k 2 with
We form an election with m candidates, c 1 , . . . , c m , and 2n + 1 voters (we describe the choice of n later). The first n + 1 voters have preference order:
and the remaining n voters have preference order:
Since R f satisfies the fixed-majority criterion, in this election it outputs the unique winning committee M = {c 1 , . . . , c k }. However, consider committee S:
Since m ≥ 2k, the difference between the scores of M and S is:
, we observe that for large enough n the difference score(M ) − score(S) becomes negative. This is a contradiction showing that (ii) holds.
Let us take a step back and consider what condition (ii) from Theorem 5 means (recall Figure 1) . Intuitively, it resembles the convexity condition, but 'focused' on g m,k (k).
Definition 7. Let g m,k be a counting function for some top-k-counting function
On the other hand, we say that g is concave if for each k ′ with 2 ≤ k ′ ≤ k it holds that:
The notions of convexity and concavity are standard, but allow us to express many features of top-k-counting rules in a very intuitive way. For example, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5. The counting function for the Bloc rule is linear (and, thus, both convex and concave), and the counting function for the Perfectionist rule is convex, so these two rules satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. On the other hand, the counting function for α k -CC is concave and, so, this rule fails the criterion (as we observed in Example 3).
By Proposition 3, a family of concave counting functions g m,k corresponds to a nonincreasing OWA operator, and a family of convex counting functions corresponds to a nondecreasing one. Skowron et al. [SFL15] provided evidence that rules based on nonincreasing OWA operators are computationally easier than those based on general OWA operators (though, still their winners tend to be NP-hard to compute). In the next section we show that this seems to be the case for top-kcounting rules as well, but we also provide a striking example highlighting certain dissimilarity.
Complexity of Top-k-Counting Rules
In this section, we consider the computational complexity of winner determination for top-kcounting rules which are based on either convex or concave counting functions. We start by considering several examples.
It is well-known that Bloc winners can be computed in polynomial time. The same holds for the Perfectionist rule.
Proposition 7. Both the Bloc and Perfectionist winners are computable in polynomial time.
Proof. The case of Bloc is well-known (as we mentioned, the Bloc rule is weakly separable and to form a winning committee of size k it suffices to pick k candidates with the highest k-Approval scores). To find a size-k winning committee under the Perfectionist rule, for each voter v we consider the set of her top-k candidates as a committee, and compute the score of that committee in the election. We output those committees-among the considered ones-that have the highest score. Correctness follows by noting that the committees that the algorithm considers are the only ones with nonzero scores.
While the result for the Perfectionist rule is very simple, it stands in sharp contrast to the results of Skowron, Faliszewski and Lang [SFL15] . By Proposition 3, Perfectionist is defined through the OWA operator (0, . . . , 0, 1), and Skowron et al. have shown that, in general, rules defined through this operator are NP-hard to compute and very difficult to approximate. However, their result relies on the fact that voters can approve any number of candidates, while in our case they have to approve exactly k of them. This shows very clearly that even though top-k-counting rules are OWA-based, we cannot simply carry over the hardness results of Skowron et al. [SFL15] or Aziz et al. [AGG + 15] to our framework.
We can generalize Proposition 7 to rules that are, in some sense, similar to Perfectionist. To this end, and to facilitate our later discussion regarding the complexity of top-k-counting rules, we define the following property of counting functions.
Definition 8. Let g m,k be a counting function for a top-k-counting function
We define the singularity of g m,k , denoted sing(g m,k ), to be
Loosely speaking, sing(g m,k ) is the smallest integer in {2, . . . , k} for which the differential of g m,k changes. For Bloc (which is an exception) we define sing(g m,k ) to be ∞, since the differential is a constant function. Naturally, for all other non-constant rules, the singularity is finite. For example, for Perfectionist we have sing(g m,k ) = k.
We generalize the polynomial-time algorithm for Perfectionist to similar rules, for which the value sing(g m,k ) is close to k. Proof. Let the input consist of election E = (C, V ) and positive integer k, and let W be a winning committee in R(E, k). We assume that q < k 2 (if it were not the case, then k ≤ 2q would be small and we could solve the problem using brute-force). We consider two cases: (1) there is at least one voter that has at least sing(g m,k ) of his or her top k candidates in W ; (2) every voter has less than sing(g m,k ) of his or her top k candidates in W .
If case (1) holds, then we can compute W (or some other winning committee) by checking, for each voter v, all the committees that consist of at least sing(g m,k ) candidates that v ranks among his or her top k positions. Since k − sing(g m,k ) ≤ q, the number of committees that we have to check for each voter is:
which is a polynomial in k and m. The above inequality requires some care: We have that
and, in effect, we have that for each t ∈ {sing(g m,k ), . . . , k} it holds that
If case (2) holds, then from the fact that g m,k (x) − g m,k (x − 1) is a constant for x ≤ sing(g m,k ), we infer that g m,k (x) is effectively linear. Then, it suffices to compute the winning committee using the Bloc rule. While we do not know which of the two cases holds, we can compute the two committees, one as in case (1) and one as in case (2), and output the one with the higher score (or either of them, in case of a tie).
Example 4. Consider the following committee scoring function:
f ′ m,k (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = f Bloc (i 1 , . . . , i k ) + f Perf (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = α k (i 1 ) + · · · + α k (i k−1 ) + 2α k (i k ).
As a simple application of Proposition 8, we get that the committee scoring rule R f ′ defined through f ′ is polynomial-time computable. This rule can be seen as a variant of Bloc, where a voter gives additional one bonus point to a committee if he or she approves of all its members. By Corollary 6, this rule is fixed-majority consistent.
It is also interesting to consider the rule which is defined through the following committee scoring function:
The corresponding rule is also polynomial-time computable (it suffices to compute an SNTV winning committee, and compare it with such committees whose all members stand on first k positions in some voter's preference ranking), but it is not a top-k-counting rule and, so, it fails the fixed-majority criterion.
Yet, as one might expect, not all top-k-counting rules are polynomial-time solvable and, indeed, most of them are not (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions). For example, α k -CC is NP-hard (this follows quite easily from Theorem 1 of Procaccia et al. [PRZ08] ; we include a brief proof to substantiate the discussion and give the reader some intuition).
Proposition 9. For α k -CC it is NP-hard to decide whether or not there exists a committee with at least a given score (recall that k in α k -CC is the committee size and, thus, is part of the input).
Proof. The NP-hardness follows easily from a standard reduction from the EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS problem, abbreviated as X3C. In an instance of X3C we are given a family of m subsets, S 1 , . . . , S m , each of cardinality 3, chosen from a given universal set U = {x 1 , . . . , x 3n }; we ask if there are n subsets from the family whose union is U . Additionally, we may assume that each element of U belongs to at most three subsets since it is well-known that this variant of X3C remains NP-complete.
Given an instance of X3C, we create a candidate for each subset, and a voter for each element of U . Voters rank the elements of the subsets to which they belong in their top positions, then they rank some n dummy candidates (different ones for each voter), and then all the remaining candidates (in some arbitrary, easy to compute, order). We ask for a committee of size k = n. There is a winning committee with score 3n if and only if the answer for the input instance is "yes."
We generalize the above NP-hardness result to the case of convex top-k-counting rules R f for which there is some constant c such that for each k and m it holds that k − sing(g m,k ) ≥ k/c (that is, to the case of convex counting functions for which the differential changes 'early'). An analogous result for concave counting functions follows from the works of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] 
there is a polynomial time algorithm that given x and k outputs g k (x)). Moreover, for each k, g k (k) is polynomially bounded in k.
There is a constant c such that, for each size of committee k greater than some fixed constant
k 0 , g k is convex and k − sing(g k ) ≥ k/c.
Then, deciding if there is a committee with at least a given score is
Proof. We prove NP-hardness of the problem by giving a reduction from the CLIQUE problem on regular graphs. A graph is regular if all its vertices have the same degree. In the CLIQUE problem we are given a graph G and an integer h, and we ask if there exists a set of h pairwise adjacent vertices in G (such a set of vertices is referred to as a size-h clique). The problem remains NP-complete when restricted to regular graphs [GJ79] .
Let G be the input regular graph, let h be the size of the clique sought for, and let δ be the common degree of G's vertices. If h > δ + 1, then, of course, the graph does not contain a sizeh clique and we output a fixed "no"-instance of our problem. Otherwise, we output an instance according to the following construction (intuitively, since each g k is convex, the rule promotes situations where voters rank many members of the committee among their top k candidates; we exploit this fact).
We set the committee size k to be (c+2)h. Since g k does not depend on the number of candidates in the election, this fixes the counting function that we work with and we will denote it g. If k ≤ k 0 (recall that k 0 is defined in the statement of the theorem), then we solve the input instance using brute force in polynomial time and output either a fixed "yes"-instance or a fixed "no"-instance, depending on the result. We note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ sing(g), all the values g(i) − g(i − 1) are equal and, without loss of generality, we can assume them to either all be 0s or all be 1s (if this were not the case, we could scale g appropriately). Similarly, since g is convex, we can assume that g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) > 1. We note that k − sing(g) ≥ k/c = (c + 2)h/c > h and, so, sing(g) < k − h.
We form an election with the following candidates:
1. For each vertex v from the graph G, we create a candidate v.
2. We create a set {c 1 , . . . , c sing(g)−2 } of candidates, called the edge-filler candidates. These candidates will be in the top-k positions of all the voters, and hence will be chosen to every winning committee.
Sufficiently many dummy candidates (different dummy candidates for each filler voter).
(The role of the 2g(k) multiplicity factor regarding both the edge voters and the filler voters it to ensure that the best committee does not contain any of the dummy candidates; this will become clear later in the proof.) We ask whether there is a committee W whose score is at least T = T 1 + T 2 + T 3 + T 4 , where:
Note that each T i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, is nonnegative (for T 4 this is due to convexity of g). The meaning of these values will become clear throughout the proof. This finishes the construction. Due to the assumptions regarding the counting function, the reduction is polynomial-time computable.
Let us now argue that the reduction is correct. First, we claim that if a committee W has a score of at least T , then it must contain all the edge-filler candidates and all the general-filler candidates. We note that altogether we have k − h edge-filler and general-filler candidates. Consider some committee W ′ that contains k − h − x candidates of these two types, where x ≥ 1. This means that W ′ contains at most h + x dummy candidates.
Let y be the number of filler voters that rank at least k − h members of W ′ among their top k positions. Let us call these filler voters well-satisfied. For each of the well-satisfied filler voters, the members of W ′ ranked on top k positions are (a) the k − h − x edge-filler and general-filler candidates from W ′ , and (b) at least x unique dummy candidates. Thus it must hold that xy ≤ h + x and, so, y ≤ h x + 1. If x ≥ 2, then it must be that y ≤ h. If x = 1, then this inequality gives us that y ≤ h + 1. However, for y to be h + 1, W ′ would have to consist of k − h − 1 edge-filler and general-filler candidates and h + 1 dummy candidates. Each of these dummy candidates would have to be ranked among top k positions by exactly one of the y well-satisfied filler voters. This would mean that for each edge voter, the only members of W ′ ranked by this voter among top k positions would be (some of) the edge-filler candidates. Consequently, all the edge voters would rank at most k − h − 1 members of W ′ among their top k positions. In either case (that is, irrespective if x = 1 or x ≥ 2), we can upper-bound the score of committee W ′ by assuming that there are 2g(k) · (m + h) · g(k) − h voters that assign score g(k − h − 1) to W ′ and 2g(k) · m + h voters that assign score g(k) to it. In effect, we have the following inequalities (also see the explanations below):
The second inequality holds because g(k − h) > g(k − h − 1) + 1 (which holds due to the fact that g is convex, g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) > 1, and sing(g) < k − h). Further inequalities hold due to simple calculations. Due to the above reasoning, we can assume that every committee with score at least T contains all the k − h filler candidates. Consider some committee that contains all the k − h filler candidates. We claim that if this committee contains some dummy candidates then there is another committee with a higher score. Why is this so? Assume that the committee contains some z dummy candidates (z ≤ h). If we simply removed these dummy candidates (obtaining a smaller committee) then we would lose at most z · g(k) points. Then, we could bring the committee back to its intended side by performing the following operations sufficiently many times: Either adding to the committee a single vertex candidate (already connected by an edge to one from the committee) or adding to the committee two vertex candidates connected by an edge. Each of these actions increases the score of the committee by at least 2g(k) g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) > 2g(k) (because for each edge there are 2g(k) corresponding edge voters). Thus, would obtain a committee with a score higher than the one we have started with. (Note that, technically, there might be no sequence of operations that brings our committee back to size k, but this would only happen if the graph had too few edges to contain a clique of size h and we could recognize that this is the case in polynomial time.)
Let W be some winning committee that contains all the k − h filler candidates, and some h vertex candidates (by the above paragraph, this committee cannot contain any dummy candidates), and let r be the number of edges that connect the vertices corresponding to the vertex candidates from W . Let us now calculate the score of W . The filler candidates provide score T 1 . The situation regarding the edge voters requires more care.
Each edge voter gets score at least g(sing(g)−2) due to the edge-filler candidates. For each edge for which at least one endpoint is in W , we get additional g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2) points, and for each edge whose both endpoints are in W , we get yet additional g(sing(g))− g(sing(g)− 1) points. Thus, the edge voters give W the following score (see detailed explanations below):
The first main term corresponds to the points all the edge voters receive, the second is the correction for edge voters that correspond to edges that have at least one endpoint in W (note that if for some edge both its endpoints belong to W , then we add g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2) twice, once for each endpoint), and the final term corresponds to the correction for edges that have two endpoints in W . Let us now explain why this final correction is appropriate. Consider some edge voter for an edge whose both endpoints are in W . For this voter, we account g(sing(g) − 2) points that each edge voter gets, we account g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2) points for each of the endpoints, and g(sing(g)) − g(sing(g) − 1) − 2(g(sing(g) − 1) − g(sing(g) − 2)) points of the final correction.
Altogether, this sums up to:
This means that, indeed, we compute the score of edge voters for edges whose both endpoints are in W correctly. The same holds for all the other edge voters (and follows directly from the above analysis). Finally, we note that the score W that we obtain from the edge voters is maximized when r is maximized. The maximum value that r may have is h 2 , which happens if and only if the vertex candidates in W correspond to a clique. Then the score that the edge voters provide equals T 2 + T 3 + T 4 and the total score of the committee is T .
We conclude, that there exists a committee with score at least T if and only if the input graph contains a size-h clique.
Let us now discuss the assumptions of the theorem, where they come from and why we believe they are natural (or necessary).
First, the assumption that the counting functions are computable in polynomial time is standard and clear. Indeed, it would not be particularly interesting to seek hardness results if already the counting functions were hard to compute.
Second, we believe that the assumption that the counting functions g m,k do not depend on m is reasonable. For example, it is quite intuitive that adding some candidates that all the voters rank last should not have any effect on the committee selected by a top-k-counting rule. (The assumption is also very helpful on the technical level. Our construction uses a number of dummy candidates that depends on the values of the counting function. If the values of the counting function depended on the number of candidates, we might end up with a very problematic, circular dependence.)
Third, the assumption that there is a constant c such that for each large enough committee size k we have k − sing(g k ) ≥ k/c says that the function "shows its convex behavior" early enough. As shown in Proposition 8, some assumption of this form is necessary (though there is still a gap, since the bounds from the theorem and from Proposition 8 do not match perfectly), and it is the core of the theorem.
Finally, perhaps the least intuitive assumption in this theorem is the requirement that for a given committee size k, the highest value of the counting function is polynomially bounded in k. The reason for having it is that if the highest value were extremely large (say, exponentially large with respect to k) then, for sufficiently few voters (for example, polynomially many), the rule might degenerate to a polynomial-time computable rule (for example, it might resemble the Perfectionist rule for this case). Exactly to avoid such problems, in our proof we use a number of voters that depends on g k (k). Our reduction would not run in polynomial time if g k (k) were superpolynomial.
A result similar to Theorem 10, but for concave rules, is possible as well (and, in essence, follows from the proofs of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] and Aziz et al. [AGG + 15] ). Thus, in general, top-k-counting functions tend to be NP-hard to compute. What can we do if we need to use them anyway? There are several possibilities. We consider approximability and fixed-parameter tractability as possible approaches.
Approximability
First, for concave top-k-counting rules we can obtain a constant-factor approximation algorithm (we deduce it from the result of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang [SFL15] , which-in essence-boils down to optimizing a submodular function using the seminal results of Nemhauser et al. [NWF78] ). Before we define the DAMKS problem, we need to provide some notation. In this paper we reserved the symbols E and V to denote elections and voter collections, respectively. These symbols are also commonly used to denote the sets of edges and vertices of graphs. To avoid confusion, given a graph G, we refer to its sets of vertices and edges as V (G) and E(G), respectively. The density of a graph G is defined as δ = Proof. Let θ be a positive real, 0 < θ < 1. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a polynomial-time algorithm A that, given an election E and committee size k, outputs a committee W such that, under NearlyBloc the score of W is at least an θ fraction of the score of the winning committee. Using A, we will derive an θ 2 -approximation algorithm for the DAMKS problem. Let I be an instance of the DAMKS problem with a graph G and an integer K. Our algorithm proceeds as follows. For each B, 1 ≤ B ≤ K, we form an election E B = (C B , V B ) where:
1. The set of candidates is C B = V (G) ∪ e∈E(G) D e , where for each e ∈ E(G), D e = {d e,1 , . . . d e,B−2 } is the set of dummy candidates needed for our construction.
2. The collection V B of voters is such that for each edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E(G) we have exactly one voter with preference order of the form {u 1 , u 2 } ≻ D e ≻ · · · .
For each election E B , we run algorithm A to find a committee W B of size B. Each such committee W B generates an induced graph G B with the vertex set V (G) ∩ W B . We let G 0 be the trivial subgraph of G consisting of two vertices and their connecting edge (if G had no edges, then we could output a trivial optimal solution at this point). We output the densest graph among G 0 , G 1 , . . . , G K . Let us now argue that the above algorithm is an . In this case, the density of the optimal graph is at most equal to . In this case we know that there exists a size-B committee for election E B with score at least X. Indeed, the committee that consists of the vertices from G ′ obtains one point for each edge from G ′ and has score X. Thus A for E B and committee size B outputs a committee W ′ with score at least θX. Let U ′ = W ′ ∩ V (G) (that is, let U ′ be the part of this committee that consists of the vertex candidates) and let D ′ = W ′ − U ′ (that is, let D ′ be the set of dummy candidates from W ′ ). We observe that the graph induced by U ′ has at least θX − |D ′ | edges. To see this, note that since each dummy candidate is ranked among top B positions by exactly one voter, removing a dummy candidate from the committee-in effect decreasing the committee size-decreases the total score by at most one. Thus the committee consisting only of candidates from U ′ has score at least θX − |D ′ | and each of the points obtained by this committee comes from an edge between some members of U ′ .
The graph induced by U ′ has density δ ′ such that:
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that B < θx. Indeed, note that:
By our assumptions, one of these conditions must hold. This means that the graph induced by U ′ is an θ-approximate solution for I.
Since in both cases we obtain at least θ 2 -approximate solutions, our algorithm is θ 2 -approximate. Since it is clear that it runs in polynomial time, the proof is complete.
Nonetheless, for top-k-counting rules that are not too far from α k -CC, we have a polynomialtime approximation scheme (PTAS), that is, an algorithm that can achieve any desired approximation ratio, as long as the number of candidates is not too large relative to the committee size. This result holds even for rules that are not concave (provided they satisfy the conditions of the theorem); the result follows by noting that our voters have non-finicky utilities [SFL15] . Consider an input election E = (C, V ) with m candidates, and committee size k, such that m = o(k 2 ). By Proposition 3, we know that f m,k is OWA-based, that it uses some OWA operator Λ m,k that has nonzero entries on the top ℓ positions only, and that it uses scoring function α k (which is a (1, k m )-non-finicky). Thus, due to Skowron et al. [SFL15] , there is a polynomial-time
-approximation algorithm for computing the score of a winning committee under f . 7 Using the assumption that m = o(k 2 ), the approximation ratio of the algorithm is:
This completes the proof.
Theorem 13 is quite remarkable even for the case of α k -CC (let alone that it applies to a somewhat more general set of rules). Indeed, generally, variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule that use some sort of approval scoring function are hard to compute [PRZ08, BSU13] and the best possible approximation ratio for a polynomial-time algorithm, in the general case, is 1 − 1 e (this result was observed by Skowron and Faliszewski [SF15] and follows from results for the MaxCover problem [Fei98] ). However, this upper bound relies on the fact that there is no connection between the size of the input election, the committee size, and the number of candidates that each voter approves. We obtain a PTAS because we assume that for the committee size k each voter approves of k candidates, and that the number m of candidates is such that m = o(k 2 ).
One may ask how likely it is that this last assumption holds. As a piece of anecdotal evidence, we mention that in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland, there were k = 460 seats in the parliament and m ≈ 8000 candidates. In this case, m/k 2 ≈ 0.0378, which suggests that our algorithm could be effective (provided that the voters could say which k candidates they approve of; likely, this would require some sort of simplified ballots, for example, allowing one to approve blocks of candidates).
Fixed-Parameter Tractability
If one were not interested in approximation algorithms but still wanted to use top-k-counting rules, then one might seek fixed-parameter tractable algorithms. In parameterized complexity we concen-trate on some distinguished parameter in the problem instances, such as the number of candidates or the number of voters. We say that a parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable (is in FPT) if there is an algorithm that, given an instance of this problem of size n with parameter t, computes an answer for the problem in time f (t)n O(1) , where f is some computable function (such an algorithm is also said to run in FPT-time with respect to parameter t). For a detailed description of parameterized complexity, we point the readers to the books of Downey We start with a very simple observation, namely that a winning committee can be computed for every top-k-counting rule in FPT time for the parameterization by the number of candidates. Let k be the input committee size and E = (C, V ) be the input election, where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is the set of candidates, V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is the collection of voters.
We enumerate all the nonempty subsets of V as S 1 , . . . , S 2 n −1 . For each i ∈ [2 n − 1], let T (S i ) denote the largest set of candidates that satisfies the following condition: Every voter in S i ranks each candidate from T (S i ) among the top k positions and no other voter ranks either of the candidates from T (S i ) among top k positions. Note that T (S 1 ), . . . , T (S 2 n ) is a partition of C. We illustrate this partition in the following example. subject to:
(a) Our algorithm forms a mixed integer linear program with the following variables. We have 2 n −1 integer variables, z 1 , . . . z 2 n −1 , where, intuitively, each z i describes how many candidates from the set T (S i ) we take into the winning committee. For each i ∈ [n] we also have an integer variable x i , which describes how many candidates from the top k positions of the preference order of voter v i belongs to the winning committee. Finally, for each variable x i , we have rational variables x i,j , 0 ≤ x i,j ≤ 1, such that (intuitively) each x i,j is 1 if x i is at least j. We present our mixed integer linear program in Figure 2 . To solve this program, we invoke Lenstra's famous result in its variant for mixed integer programming [Len83, Section 5].
Now it remains to argue that it indeed outputs a correct solution, that is, that the variables z 1 , . . . , z 2 n −1 describe a winning committee. If all the variables have the intended, intuitive values (as described in the preceding paragraph), then-with our maximization goal in mind-one can verify that variables z 1 , . . . , z 2 n −1 describe a winning committee. Thus we show that, indeed, all the variables have their intended values.
Due to constraints (a) and (e), variables z 1 , . . . , z 2 n −1 certainly describe a possible committee of size k (from each set T (S i ) we take z i arbitrary candidates). Constraints (b) ensure the correct values of variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Finally, the maximization goal and constraints (c) ensure that each variable x i,j is 1 exactly if x i ≥ j and is 0 otherwise. This is so, because g m,k is concave. Thus, if for some values j and j ′ with j < j ′ it was the case that x i,j < 1 and x i,j ′ > 0 then increasing x i,j and decreasing x i,j ′ by the same amount (without breaking constraint (d)) would yield a higher value of the function to be maximized.
To summarize, it appears that most (but certainly not all) top-k-counting rules are NP-hard to compute. For top-k-counting rules based on concave counting functions, there are good polynomialtime approximation algorithms and some exact FPT algorithms. On the other hand, for rules based on convex functions the situation is much more difficult. Aside from several algorithms that do not depend on concavity or convexity of the counting problem (for instance the algorithms from Theorem 13 and Proposition 14), so far we only have evidence for hardness of approximation.
Conclusions and Further Research
Aiming at finding a multiwinner analogue of the single-winner Plurality rule, we have shown that the answer is quite involved. While intuitively SNTV is a natural analogue of Plurality, it fails the fixed-majority criterion (which Plurality satisfies in the single-winner setting). We have found that, among all committee scoring rules, only the top-k-counting rules-a class of rules we have defined in this paper-have a chance of satisfying our criterion, and we have characterized exactly when this happens. Specifically, we have shown that the committee scoring rules which satisfy the fixedmajority criterion are exactly those top-k-counting rules whose counting functions satisfy a relaxed variant of convexity.
For example, the Bloc and Perfectionist rules both satisfy the fixed-majority criterion and, so, in some sense, they are among the multiwinner analogues of Plurality (for the Perfectionist rule this goes quite deep). On the other hand, a variant of the Chamberlin-Courant rule based on k-Approval scoring function is top-k-counting, but fails the fixed-majority criterion.
We believe that it is most interesting to focus on top-k-counting rules based either on convex or on concave counting functions. These two classes of rules are different in some interesting way. On the one hand, top-k-counting rules based on convex counting functions are fixed-majority consistent, but seem very hard to compute (with a few exceptions). On the other hand, top-k-counting rules based on concave counting functions fail the fixed-majority criterion (the borderline case of Bloc rule excluded), but are much easier to compute (typically still NP-hard, but with constant-factor polynomial-time approximation algorithms and FPT algorithms for the parameterization by the number of voters).
Our work leads to a number of open questions. In the axiomatic direction, it would be interesting to provide a characterization of committee scoring rules along the lines of Young's characterization for their single-winner counterparts [You75] . On the computational front, it would be interesting to find more powerful algorithms for computing winning committees under various top-k-counting rules (e.g., for the α k -PAV rule).
